Microsoft said that three factors caused a cascading failure across its infrastructure, which impacted services globally.
Several Microsoft services were said to have experienced disruption
Photo Credit: Microsoft
Microsoft has revealed the technical reasons behind the major global outage that disrupted Outlook and several other Microsoft 365 services on November 12. According to a company official, the disruption was triggered by a combination of a previously undetected software defect, an increase in network traffic, and reduced server capacity. These factors eventually caused a cascading failure across Microsoft's infrastructure, with the tech giant initially struggling to restore normal operations.
Charles Lamanna, Executive Vice President of Copilot, Agents, and Platform at Microsoft, detailed the root cause in a post on X. According to the executive, three factors combined to cause a global outage affecting the networking gateway that sits in front of several Microsoft 365 services.
More details on the root cause can be found in the Microsoft 365 Admin center, and an abridged version can be found below. We are deeply sorry for the impact to all our customers and recognize the impact that this has on their normal business & operations. The incident on Thursday, November 12th, 2026, was caused by three main factors that together caused a global outage for the networking gateway that fronts many Microsoft 365 services. First, a latent defect caused servers to become overwhelmed and unresponsive under certain load conditions. This was due to lock contention inside an internal process which caused the machine to become unavailable. This defect was the result of a fix that was prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the underlying defect nor the fix applies to broader Windows deployments. The initial change in behavior first started deployment in July of this year. The update went through safe deployment and saturated globally over several weeks, during which time no issues were observed. For more than three months, the change was deployed worldwide without impact. Our normal load testing did not detect the latent issue because the different traffic and SKU mix used in our test labs. The contention issue is worsened on machines with more cores and newer hardware; whereas our load testing tended to focus on our weaker hardware SKUs with fewer cores. Second, a surge in load increased the likelihood for the networking gateways to encounter the contention. Within Microsoft 365, we maintain two independent and heterogenous network gateway systems designed for isolation and high availability. This allows many Microsoft 365 services to fail to/from them during outages or disruptions. Approximately fifteen hours before the outage, Teams failed over from the alternative networking gateway to the ‘primary' gateway that also supports Exchange Online. This increased the load on the networking gateway and changed its traffic patterns. This type of failover is part of normal operations and is integral to standard Microsoft resiliency efforts. Third, at the same time, nearly 14% of server capacity for the networking gateway was out of service due to an unrelated issue from the previous day. This server capacity was on track to be returned to active service through routine maintenance and health processes. The service had sufficient capacity headroom, so the reduction in server capacity had no impact on its own. Taken together, the increased load and the reduced server capacity, caused the network gateway to encounter the latent bug from July. This caused requests to build up until servers ultimately stopped responding. This occurred during the peak window of traffic in the United States. When servers lose connectivity, our traffic management systems automatically route users to other healthy endpoints. This happens often and is critical to avoiding any interruption due to hardware, software, or network defects and is normally what makes the service resilient. However, the redirected traffic increased the likelihood for the same problem to occur on the remaining endpoints. This caused a cascading failure from server to server as the same amount of load was spread across fewer servers. In less than two hours, the previously unknown defect was encountered across our fleet and rendered them unresponsive. At its lowest, more than 80% of servers were unresponsive. Normally, the network gateway is composed of thousands of ‘capacity units' which represent shards of capacity, hardware, and networking infrastructure. These ‘capacity units' are then organized into regions. In this case, due to a separate issue, the normal bulkheads between these different partitions did not stop the cascading failure. This is what allowed the impact to spread across our network gateway infrastructure globally. Several services like Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Office apps failed out of the faulty network gateway infrastructure. That is why those services were restored earlier, with Teams chats and meetings functioning without issue for most of the outage. But not all services, like Exchange Online, can fail out of this network gateway. Recovery took longer than usual because as servers returned to service, they were immediately overwhelmed by waiting traffic and became unresponsive again. Our normally automated recovery processes were not designed to restore service from this broad unresponsive state. Additionally, since the main code defect was a latent bug from several months previous, our normal rollback, flighting, and feature flags were unable to quickly revert the change. After engineers confirmed the defect as the cause, we developed an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state. To effectively apply this fix, and to slowly bring the service online again, we took groups of servers out of service, applied the change, and restarted them before returning them to service. This process was carefully applied to large quantities of infrastructure at a time (e.g. 50%+ of a region). The final Post-Incident Review (PIR) will provide more details later this week.
— Charles Lamanna (@clamanna) November 16, 2026The first was a previously undetected software defect that caused servers to become overwhelmed and unresponsive under certain load conditions. According to the company, the issue was linked to lock contention within an internal process. This eventually made the affected machines unavailable.
Microsoft said that the defect originated from a fix developed specifically for its Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers. The initial change began rolling out in July this year and was deployed globally over several weeks.
It, however, did not cause any noticeable problems for more than three months, while Microsoft also failed to identify it during regular load testing.
The second factor was an increase in load on the affected networking gateway. As per Microsoft, it maintains two independent and different network gateway systems to provide isolation and improve service availability during disruptions. Approximately 15 hours before the outage, however, Microsoft Teams switched from the alternative gateway to the primary networking gateway.
While it was part of the company's regular failover operations, it increased the load on the primary gateway and changed its traffic patterns. Simultaneously, nearly 14 percent of the networking gateway's server capacity was unavailable due to an unrelated issue from the previous day.
This combination of increased traffic, reduced server capacity, and the latent software defect is said to have proved problematic, with requests accumulating on the affected servers until they eventually stopped responding.
Microsoft further explained that the situation worsened when its traffic management systems began redirecting users to other healthy endpoints after servers lost connectivity. While this process is normally intended to prevent service interruptions when individual machines or network components fail, the redirected traffic placed additional pressure on the remaining servers.
As more machines became unresponsive, the company claims that the same volume of requests was distributed across fewer available servers. This increased the likelihood of further failures. At the worst point of the outage, more than 80 percent of the networking gateway servers were unresponsive, as per Microsoft.
Another issue identified by the company was with the infrastructure's usual isolation mechanisms. Microsoft explained that its networking gateway is divided into thousands of capacity units, which are organised into different regions. These partitions are designed to prevent a problem in one section from spreading to others. A separate problem, however, prevented these safeguards from containing the cascading failure, which ultimately caused the disruption to spread across the global networking gateway infrastructure.
Lamanna also revealed that not all Microsoft services experienced the same level of disruption or recovered at the same time. While Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Office apps were able to fail out of the faulty networking gateway infrastructure, Exchange Online, which powers Microsoft's email service Outlook, could not use the same failover option.
This made restoring access to mailboxes more difficult and contributed to the longer disruption experienced by Outlook users, as per the company. It also faced problems when attempting to bring affected servers back online, as machines were overwhelmed by the large volume of requests waiting to be processed and became unresponsive again.
Once engineers identified the software defect as the cause, Microsoft claims to have developed an update that restored the affected code path to its previously known working state. During its implementation, the company took groups of servers out of service, applied the update, restarted the machines, and gradually returned them to active service.
This approach is said to have allowed engineers to check stability as traffic was gradually restored. As per Lamanna, the company's final Post-Incident Review (PIR), which is expected later this week, will provide further details about the incident.
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